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security

  • Group: Security
  • When it activates: Reviewing or auditing the project’s security, hardening auth / an API / an AI agent, hardening, authorized pentesting, OWASP, prompt injection, XSS/CSRF/SSRF/IDOR, security headers
  • Requires: code-quality
  • Installed: Always: comes with every project.

Make the application withstand whoever attacks it: review it, find the holes with PROOF and close them. It does not replace code-quality (which already carries the per-vulnerability detail); this skill is the security GATEWAY: the review method, the pentesting policy and the hardening of AI agents. The command is /security.

Task Read only
Review/audit the project’s security (the WHAT that /security runs) references/metodo-revision.md
Pentesting, scanning or exploitation (scope, authorization, the wall) references/pentesting.md
Harden an AI agent / LLM app (prompt injection, tools) references/agentes-ia.md
Per-vulnerability detail (injection, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, uploads…) code-quality §references/security-owasp.md
Login, sessions, JWT, OAuth, 2FA, password reset code-quality §references/auth-patterns.md
Architecture of an LLM app (RAG, streaming, costs, evals) code-quality §references/llm-apps.md
Secrets, environments, leaks and rotation in deployment deploy-ops §references/envs-secrets.md
Supply chain (packages/ skills with malware or typosquatting) /dependencies command + supply-guard wall
  1. Authorize on the server, on every operation, on the specific resource. Access control is the number 1 failure (OWASP A01). A menu hidden in the UI is not authorization.
  2. Validate all input on the server with an allowlist (schema), fail closed, least privilege and minimal surface. Client-side validation is UX only.
  3. Secrets never in the repo, in logs, in the client bundle or in a prompt. Leaked secret = rotate it NOW (then clean the history). .env.example without real values.
  4. Every finding with EVIDENCE: where it is (file:line or request), why it is exploitable and how it is fixed. Without proof it is not a finding, it is a hunch. When it is closed, it is re-verified.
  5. User input and what an LLM retrieves are DATA, not instructions. Real privileges live outside the model: tools with an allowlist and the real user’s authorization; human confirmation for anything irreversible (see references/agentes-ia.md).
  6. Pentesting ONLY with written authorization and a defined scope. The pentest-guard wall stops offensive tools (nmap, sqlmap, hydra, metasploit…); the SENZU_ALLOW_PENTEST=1 escape is for an authorized engagement documented in the devlog (references/pentesting.md).
  7. Defensive security by default. You build to resist attacks and test your own systems with permission; no malware, no exploits for third parties, no detection evasion with malicious intent.

code-quality carries the per-vulnerability detail (OWASP, auth, LLM) · backend-audit audits architecture and debt · the /dependencies command + the supply-guard wall cover the supply chain · deploy-ops deployment security (secrets, access) · walls that already protect: secrets-guard (secrets in code), backend-guard (mass-assignment, PII in logs), pentest-guard (pentesting scope).